Before anything else we may say the 2013 June Riots––the fabric of uprisings spread around the streets and networks of Brazil as a whole, between its comings and goings, lasting from June 2013 up to mid 2014––, are an issue of perception and meaning. If it is possible to highlight something about the uprisings is their unhighlightable nature. However, unhighlightable is not a synonym for meaningless; on the contrary, it is the accumulation of a vast range of movable and permutable meanings and perspectives. Distinct social assemblages perceived, experienced and still experience the riots singularly. To some extent, the riots have led to an effect of denaturalizing the perception of social relations, creating and opening reconfigurations capable of multiplying meanings. June's rebellion cracked the linear history around it and new perceptions, significations and perspectives started to violently imply one another.

For communication theorists and semioticians, events as intense as the June 2013 Riots placed Brazil within an inescapable issue: the politics of production of meaning. The multiplicity of perceptions, meanings and perspectives reinstated one of the major semiotics problems: the relationship between fact and representation; things and words; object of statement and subject of enunciation. By that, I do not exclusively mean June events constituted an impasse of meaning, or remained irreducible to any representation. This still is a false problem. The problem of meaning arises from the events' singularity. Before being irreducible to any representation, they are an absolute multiplicity of things in constant movement and combination. The riots are not an objective fact susceptible to multiple meanings or representations. On the contrary, the riots are the expression of inconstancy, of variation and of the dispute for the objectification or for the meaning of the facts related to them. That which is multiple and moving cannot be representation any longer. It is, instead, the fact itself, the object itself, the nature of reality itself.

What can semiotics do?

What can semiotics do? Readily, it is worth saying semiotics is not restricted to the study of language or verbal language. Semiotics constitutes processes of reading sign action. In these terms, it displaces and expands the problem of semiosis both behind and beyond human frame. Sign production is not a human privilege. Human is the expression of a way of living genetically connected to modern civilization, result from the progress of a long anthropotechnic journey (Ludueña, 2012). For this civilizatory model, everybody is human, except for those who are not: indigenous peoples, quilombolas, black men and women, women, n sexualities, all monstrous alterities, as well as animals, forests, oceans, the land, the air, the cosmos, that is; every different thing, everything that is not a mirror––“the accursed wish to mirror” (Rolnik, 2007: 418). Everything that does not reflect the image of the rational, Eurocentric, heterosexual, christian, bourgeois, entrepreneurial white skin and mask. These other bodies are severed by the all too human semiosis. Man-form alone may manipulate signs and manufacture significations. The cosmos' plurality has meaning only when it goes through the Western sieve.

In order to operate, the semiological anthropo-technique demands a metaphysical assumption that bifurcates the world into two discontinuous halves. On one side, Culture (the suprasensitive world), on the other, Nature (the sensitive world), and its duo avatars. The right to ontological self-determination is denied to all bodies in nature by such bifurcation. Only (Euromodern) humans are beings who exist and configure worlds. The modern-human is an Empire inside and empire, nature's state of exception. Other entities are bodies without the right to life, without ontological statute and susceptible to any kind of intervention, as they possess, at most, a culture in primitive state.

However, what we experienced with June Riots and with the network-system of global uprisings opened by the Arab Spring, and with political, economic and ecologic contemporary crises, is the impossibility of the bifurcating vision of the world to remain firmly anchored. The long journey of Modern Age humanism, as we know it, is close to its end (Mbembe, 2017). According to Schavelzon, after the hangover of all crises “we stay with something: the world is not only one any longer” . Henceforth, we will never continue to be exclusively modern. The anthropotechnic semiology sustained at the world's bifurcation––according to which nature rested at the scene's backstage, obscene, given and inaccessible, as an amorphous entity, without its own ontology––, sees itself obliged to share the world with other perceptions and perspectives.

These multiple worlds do not mean multiple cultures speaking of a sole world. It is not about relativism. The world is not given. It is a variant, it is varied, it is a variation. Each cosmos' particle is virtually coated by a layer of life, a degree of potency. Which is not a sign we have leaped into a democratic level. The multiplicity of worlds in coexistence does not deliver peace, but it puts in motion a permanent state of risk, of dispute, of war. There is no universal language able to encompass a public sphere where consensus is woven between worlds in equal conditions of speech. Even because consensus presumes assemblages will speak within the same specific grammar, what does not seem viable nor desirable any longer. An unprecedented crisis in the general theory of signs and communication is then disclosed as it is usually based on the false problem of nature bifurcation. Everything goes as if humans were solipsists and alone in the world. There is only intraspecies communication, as language is the being's home. Only humans communicate, and they do it exclusively among themselves.

However, the current experience of the world increasingly weakens and shakes semiological anthropo-technique. We can also argue such anthropo-technique only sustains itself because it can, that is; because it has political, economic, military and media force to do so. Anyhow, I believe June riots should be seen as an aberrant semiosis that opens the path to dodge anthropo-centered semiology assumptions.

Multinaturalist perspectivism

From a speculative point of view, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro's multinaturalist anthropology is an indispensable war machine to destitute the pregnancy of anthropo-technique in Modern Age. Castro's multinaturalist perspectivism make us think of a powerful semiotic procedure to conceive this rhizome of mixing worlds. In his essay O medo dos outros [The fear of the others] (2011), he clarifies: “It is important to remember there is more to perspectivism than meets the eye: there is a whole theory of sign and communication” .

Castro (2015) extracts conceptual and political consequences of perspectivism retrospecting an anecdote told by Levi-Strauss. In the beginning of the colonizing genocide, as the Spanish Jesuit in the metropole created committees of inquiry to speculate if indigenous bodies had souls or not, at the captaincies, the natives studied Europeans bodies to see if they putrefied or not. With this parable, Levi-Strauss wants to strengthen intrinsic human greed in regard to the conception of alterity for humanity. The anecdote tells us that, on one side, European ethnocentrism thought (thinks) they were in front of previous animal versions of the human (uncivilized and cultureless), what the Europeans had been in the past. On the other side, indigenous ethnocentrism suspected being in front of deities, not actual gods but the proto-humanity of myths. The civilized doubted (doubt) the savages had a human spirit, for that is the attribute assuring their humanity. The savages questioned if the civilized had bodies, for that is the attribute assuring their humanity.

However, Castro does not recognize the same greedy identity for savages and civilized in the anecdote. Greed manifests itself differently in both cases. The way of posing the problem is radically different, a difference of nature and not of degree. The equivocation of the example expresses humanity experienced by each culture. On one side, the savage conceives the Other with the Same of himself; they share the same culture, but doubt possessing the same body. The civilized, in turn, conceives the Other without the Same of himself, they share the same body, but doubt having the same soul, the same culture. “The other of the Other was not exactly the same as the other of the Same” (Castro, 2009: 51). Or yet: “The others were what we are, and not how it is for us; they are what we have been” The Great Divide does not operate equally, nature and culture are differently mobilized and ordered devices. Savages do not notice the Divide as discontinuity, as the civilized do. For Amerindians, there is no discontinuity between nature and culture, as there is for dominant Western thought, where there would be a cognitive benefit in the disruption between culture and nature.

In other words, for native Amerindians there is a universal way of accessing, knowing or representing the real: the human. For them, according to Castro (2002; 2015), there is only one epistemology (human culture) and an inconstant multiplicity of worlds, an absolutely multiple nature of bodies, that is; the reverse of mononaturalism that states the existence of a sole world or nature and a multiplicity of cultures and representations. On one side, an ontological multinaturalism, on another, an epistemological multiculturalism. It is a matter of perception. Amerindian ontology attributes a semiotic function to the body and to the symmetrically distinct soul adopted by the West. For Amerindians, the common background is the spirit or culture, implying the act of making bodies, of differentiating species. On our side, the common background is the body, implying the making of souls, of differentiating cultures. For savages, there is only one way of knowing the world, but multiple ways of perceiving it. Centrality lies in the body, in its ability to affect and be affected. What is different from the formulation stating there is only one way of perceiving the world and multiple ways of knowing, describing and representing it.

There lies a crucial political question. Multiculturalism includes only peoples or worlds of the same species within its solipsist political economy. And we are all well acquainted with the fact that, at its bottom, such inclusion operates through exclusion, as the truest culture, so to speak, the closest to the universal idea of humanity is modern culture. The rest is, in the best scenario, exoticism and, in the worst, primitivism and incivility. For modern thought, there are humans who are more entitled to humanity than others, and other cosmic entities have no right at all. In turn, Amerindian politics includes all beings: humans, non-humans and extra-humans in its cosmic political economy. Amerindian politics extends itself to all cosmos. It is a cosmopolitics, in this sense. An important aspect of such native universalism of the person, according to Castro, is not just the problem restricted to mythological images, where there would be an indiscernible zone between beings, where humans and animals would have not entered a process of speciation. Such universalism of human condition in post-mythical life operates in a dangerous state of non-appearance, of latency and potentiality.

Every being with whom a human is confronted, throughout the long process of producing its own life, may suddenly place its “other side” (common idiom in indigenous cosmologies) in front of its non-human usual appearance, actualizing its humanoid background condition and automatically placing the human interlocutor's life and category at risk.

Here lies the second fundamental aspect worth approaching in order to conceive perspectivist semiotics opened by Castro: cannibalism. Among forest peoples, the generalized predation problem is what stimulates and organizes all their social connection of desire. Predation and hunting give meaning to what they conceive as a transspecific war. In O medo dos Outros (2011), Castro asks 'what make Indians afraid?' To be precise, they are afraid of becoming preys. Among other things, it means events in their societies are named and determined by the binomial predator|prey. The semiotic-political game follows the series subject of enunciation|predator <-> object of statement|prey. All peoples have radical alterities on the prowl, an enemy always lurking around the woods. In these societies, everyone is potentially and simultaneously predator and prey. All things will be decided at each event, all things will derive from the relational field of chewing established by the encounter in the woods. Forest peoples' trans-specific political relations are established according to the food chain. That is, they are disputed by the mouth.

Castro (2011) underlines that “the greatest danger in life is the fact that human food consists entirely of souls” . The danger incurs from the condition every entity is virtually a focus of agency, a degree of potency. Not is the sense the prey is human, but in the sense of uncertainty it may have been, may be, or may come to be human. Yet, the accomplishment of any of these possibilities indicates that if the non-human prey becomes human, the risk of the human becoming non-human is real, which in Amerindian society is a fundamental political problem, for that is the politics of indeterminability determining who is the subject and who is the object. Who is devouring and who is devoured. From which arises the unquieting sensation of the predator's uncertainty when confronted with its prey.

According to Castro, human culture, in a certain sense, is the most democratically distributed and shared thing there is. Everything is, or may come to be, animated by human perception. The inapparent background of humanity may take shape of a figure according to each circumstance. In the forest, when predator and prey meet, what is at stake is the affirmation of everyone's human perspective, once human is always the agent, the subject, the predator. Every mode of existence, every point of view apprehends the multiplicity of other ways of existing and other points of view according to its own existing characteristics. The other's perspective is always included. In wild nature, each people attributes meaning to other human, non-human and extra-human peoples, from a universal point of view: human perspective . Everyone perceives existing reality according to similar ways of feeling, seeing and speaking of trans-specific relations.

However, there is no homogeneity of perception. Multinaturalism is radical. The consideration nature is physical data, fixed and an out there objective is confronted with continuous and incessant variation. It is among predator animals, above all––as we have said, personal nature does not necessarily apply to all, it is just a possibility––, that such dynamics is mostly accentuated. For example, vultures are a specific people, structured in a society where there is an instituted system just like the human one, with chiefs, shamans, celebrations and rites. Bodily attributes such as beaks, feathers and wings are ornaments or cultural instruments and, for them, worms in putrefied meat are baked fish. (Castro, 2002; 2015). Spotted jaguars or jaguars see blood as cauim , tapirs lie in muddy waters as if they were in a large ceremonial house. Thus, when (indigenous) human meets his predator (the spotted jaguar), there is a dispute for perspective. The spotted jaguar does not see human prey as a person, but as a prey. Its blood is cauim.

In seeing us as nonhumans, animals and spirits regard themselves (their own species) as human: they perceive themselves as or become anthropomorphic beings when they are in their houses or villages, and apprehend their behaviour and characteristics through a cultural form: they perceive their food as human food (Castro, 2013: 24).

Such personification, a way of conceiving oneself as people and other existing beings as animals or spirits, is relative to its occupied position in the food chain. The logic is that of the reciprocal assumption “something is only fish because there is someone of whom this something is fish” . As well as someone is only a father or mother because there is a son and vice-versa. Only through the relationship all can be fathers, mothers and sons of one another. Everything depends on the established relationships. The relationship is exterior. It precedes and establishes the terms, not the opposite. The philosophical problem of Amazonian natives, according to Castro, is to determine what they see when they eat, which relationship prevails. It is not about a multiplicity of points of view, or a relativism of points of view, which necessarily would reappoint us to the prevailing multiculturalism. Instead, it is about taking the point of view itself as multiplicity. When native and vulture look at decomposed meat (for vultures, putrefied meat is fish), they do not see the same thing from where they are. They do not see the same objective, physical thing placed in the same points in time and space. But they attribute, each according to their culture, a synonymous common notion for the apprehended object. There is not a thing in itself to which each culture will give a distinct expression. The thing in itself exists but, paradoxically, it is variation. When they look at putrefied meat, they see two different things at the same time: corpse|fish. Our blood is, differently and at the same time, blood|cauim. What will be seen will agree with the affirmed ontological perspective.

Such ontological distribution prevents Amerindians from going into the woods and taking possession of every existent being, as the retaliation risk is real and constant. Objectification is the arrival point of a dense procedure of semiotic scarification of the cosmos whose premise is the fact that everything has, has had or might have humanity. Paradoxically, objectifying for them is subjectifying. There is no fixed object. Everything is a virtual subject of enunciation. In this signification, in order to know something, it is necessary to include the other's perspective, that of the predator|prey, of the enemy, not to exclude it, but to keep the variation of life in operation. For a subject to become object there is a long and complex ritualistic process of dessubjetivization and it anthropophagically includes the other's perspective, so that hunt and enemy may finally be reified. Otherwise, acting upon other being's conduct may lead to chain retaliation.

From the semiotic point of view, it means saying all existing beings are potentially foci and subjects of enunciation. In Amerindian societies, such semiotic positions are cosmological deixis (Castro, 1996). When someone says I, and even more when they say us, such body is putting into perspective an enunciative assemblage that involves the whole cosmos. The cosmos as a whole is individuated at that moment. It is not actually about a proper subject of enunciation, but of a collective assemblage of enunciation fixed at that specific and unstable encounter in the forest. The relationship that marks the modern regime of signs (subject of enunciation ↔ object of statement) collapses. Perspectivist semiotic does not have a unifying centre of enunciation, it is an open system with a cosmic multiplicity of micro-centres of expression. It is a communication excess, the reverse of solipsism. Nothing is assured beforehand, there is no point of homogenization, of data stabilization. Better yet, such savage sign economy operates to obstruct the stratification of power-knowledge devices whose function is to integrate, homogenize and totalize (there is no State, no Capital, no Media, no Police).

June riots and perspectivist semiotics

Savage thought argues all peoples in Earth, humans, non-humans and extra-humans, factually and rightfully, posses the potency of ontological self-determination, of saying I or us. From such condition of ontological self-determination, from such ontological anarchism, derives a semiotic perspectivism according to which the statute of the subject of enunciation is uncertain and extends itself virtually to all beings in the cosmos. Perspectivist semiotics is a politics of signification, a procedure to track who is occupying the function of subject of enunciation and of object of statement in emerging events, as in the June riots. Nobody is or will continue to be a subject of enunciation, nor an object of statement at all times. Inconstancy, indetermination and subjective permutation are fundamental premises. The 'who' of things in the world is pure variation. The crucial aspect is to determine the thing's who and not their what, as Guimarães Rosa would suggest.

In June, something of such nature was accomplished. Black blocs became primordial riots' characters in several levels. One of the ways to weaken the subjective potency of their new assemblage was exactly to objectify it, to reify them into beings without humanity. The incorporeal attribute chosen for reification was that of the vandal. In these insurgent events, this attribute has recurrently served, and still does, to decant good, civilized, reasonable protesters from uncivilized violent ones. The purpose of the term is to transform subjects of enunciation who allude to things, into inhuman, lifeless objects. Black blocs could not be subjects of enunciation for they did not possess enough humanity for that. And, as it is well known, those who lack humanity, appearing as the objects of the relationship, turn into potential preys, on the verge of being devoured. And we are not referring to Amerindian societies. The attempt to transform possible subjects of enunciation into objects is viable through a political-semiotic exercise, by the use of an incorporeal attribute––masked, violent and vandals are accurate examples––expressed by a subject of enunciation naturalized as the State, the Military Police or the Media. If it is successful, the aberrant semiosis is transmuted into a thing, de-humanized into an object of statement. Thus, these bodies are made vulnerable to every sort of investment, once they are seen and spoken of as objects, as non-humans. Those who lose their condition of agents, of communication foci, are unknowingly at risk of becoming preys, objects, of being eaten, devoured.

Castro (2011) traces an analogy between the virtually dangerous violence of the encounter with the predator in Amerindian forests with the equally dangerous and violent experience of encountering the predator in capitalist concrete jungles. In the first case, the jaguar is the absolute alterity always on the prowl, hiding behind the forest's moving cracks. In the second, the Military Police, the embodiment of the State, is the absolute alterity virtually always on the prowl, hiding behind ghettos and peripheral asphalt alleys' cracks. The jaguar, Amerindian societies' predator, plays the same role as the State, capitalist societies' predator. The sensation they cause is the same in both cultures: de-humanization, objectification. The Jaguar-State has the power to steal humanity from the bodies it encounters in the jungle-city. When an existent being takes on this role (policeman, journalist, capitalist, spotted jaguar, jaguar, vulture etc) and turns the other into the second person of the relationship, they are at risk of being de-humanized, transmuted into objects, of becoming a thing. Eventually, they may be devoured.

This war of worlds constitutes the agonistic background of indigenous cosmopraxis [...] Whomever answers to a “you” said by a non-human accepts the condition of being the “second person” of the other and, when they assume the position of “I”, they will be already doing it as a non-human. The canonic form of such encounters therefore consists of suddenly finding out the other is “human”, that is, the human is the other, what automatically de-humanizes and alienates the interlocutor.

The discursive polarization and binarization in which we are currently immersed produce precisely the objectification of the other, of those who differ, with the intent of reducing other worlds to mere objects of a sole world. However, events such as the June riots evidence this internalized semiotic-political procedure. A specific protest episode is an example of such procedure: the case of Bruno Teles' arrest. In July 22nd, 2013, in one of the protests against Mega Events in Rio de Janeiro, on Guanabara Palace's street, the Military Police was confronted by a crowd. The reason for the riot was a Molotov cocktail thrown into the direction of a police group forming an isolation cordon to prevent access to the seat of government. At that point of the June riots, although the Military Police operated highly equipped with the most sophisticated gadgets of disturbance control, the resistance already had a good deal of experience on how to move in combat circumstances, specially those wearing black balaclavas.

After a few moments of intense confrontation, the Military Police arrested Bruno Teles accusing him of being responsible for throwing the homemade bomb at them. The repercussion of the case was disproportionate. This was the same event in which Media Ninja journalists were arrested, one of them live streaming his own arrest. The press, specially Globo Television, mobilized all its journalistic apparatus dedicating hours (we know how much a single second broadcasted by such television station costs) to the topic in its news programs to sentence Bruno Teles guilty before any judgement, and also to criminalize the movement as a whole. This criminalization is a result of a semiotic procedure. In this episode, the structured logic consisted of establishing who was the I that should speak and the you that should not speak, and of whom something is spoken. That is, who occupied the position of subject of enunciation and of object of statement in the narrative. In terms of perspective semiotics, (or of a savage semiotics), it was about marking who was predator and who was prey, who was agent and who was patient in such dangerous encounter. Police commandants, public prosecutors, ballistic legal experts along with a series of legal practices contributed to the institution of a discursive game, so that the vandal is transmuted into a un-human body, a mere thing, an object susceptible of political intervention, due to its condition of non-human, of vandal.

However, the protests were filmed by a series cinematic-animals (Bentes, 2014), of autonomous media collectives. From the police station, in pre-trial detention, and on the sly, Bruno Teles was interviewed by Midia Ninja and asked for the help of people who had filmed the protest to share the images, in an attempt to prove his innocence. The next day, a video composed of a multitude of different images showed he was not the agent and also his coward arrest. Moreover, the images showed an undercover policeman, a P2, had thrown the explosive and started the combat. The video went viral. On July 25th, Globo was obliged to reconsider its position, and to use images from autonomous media collective for the first time in its history, reconsidering the allegations made by public prosecutors and the Military Police that had been aired the previous day. The Media-Police apparatus had no other option but to assume the perspective of the rioting bodies. The State-Media world was not accomplished. The riot was not transmuted into an object of statement. On the contrary; it erected itself as a subject of enunciation, as a collective assemblage of enunciation. The riots made their own perspective valid. The same can be said about Amarildo's case.

Two years later, in a documentary about the case, Bruno Teles evaluated the perspectivist transformation he experimented the following way: “last night I was an arsonist, the other day I was a little boy from a family, a student, poor guy”. Bruno Teles was about to be devoured as an object by the Media-State device grid that day after day produces meanings objectifying the other. Bruno Teles was vandal|protester at the same time. With point of view variation, the world where he belonged was a completely different one. In one of them, he was gifted with humanity, a little boy from a family, a student. In the other, he was an object without a statute of humanity, a criminal, an arsonist. The June riots radically amplified the possibilities of enunciation despite the danger of objectification of the encounter with the predator, the Media-State, in the woods. And everything is still open.


The world is not just one any longer. June riots showed that, in certain conditions, it becomes impossible to transform alterity, the other, into a prey, an object, something devoid of humanity. The collective assemblage of enunciation did not respond to Media-State inquiry, ceaselessly affirming and reaffirming its condition of collective assemblage of enunciation. Every time they were accused of being vandals or violent, they invariable answered: the State is violent. Perspectives would constantly vary. Well understood, perspectivist semiotics establishes that, from the irruption of an event, necessarily blossoms a problem of meaning, of signification. The serious aspect in this process, after all, is what is at stake: which humanity is worth of being dead or alive.

The process of producing meaning appears as it is in fact: a political-semiotic dispute to see who will reach the statute of subject of enunciation and who will be objectified. “For language is a political affair before it is an affair for linguistics”. (Deleuze; Guattari, 1987, pp. 139-140). Subject and object are formalized through an entangled web of forces, practices and discourses, aiming at marking who will express the ultimate meaning about what happened. In fact, there is no object, that is: “the most subjective will be the most objective” (Deleuze; Guattari, 1994: 11). The real issue is knowing the whom of things.

However, it is difficult to establish a semiotic reading of an ecosphere where bodies are all possible foci of enunciation, where each thing is virtually an agent, the constant threat of a desire. How to formulate a diagnosis with unstable support points without prescriptive dualities? Because the prevailing perspective twill probably cause irreversible impact for assemblages that by chance, lose, even if momentarily, the dispute for the meaning of the events. This is a problem of an ethical-aesthetic paradigm. It is possible to keep the multiplicity of worlds without incurring into consensuses, colonialisms, racisms and authoritarianisms, preserving, instead, the possibility of perspectives' dissensus, the possibility of worlds variation? How to calibrate a semiotic procedure able to foresee conceptual elements adequate for this kind of reading?

Formulating the problem in such way is an exercise of reading signs whose objective is to escape from semiotic multiculturalism. Thinking of possible becomings in such event demands for and allows an escape from the aporias of ideological reductionism of exclusively identitarian and polarized politics and epistemologies (it is right-wing|it is left-wing, when it may be both at the same time, and much more than that). Perspectivist semiotics affirms the previous inclusion of the other's viewpoint to be indispensable to any process of objectification with the goal of amplifying the enunciative foci and not reduce or block its coming-to-be. All bodies of the world constitute a degree of potency. Objectifying, or pure and simply transforming bodies into objects of statement is the reproduction of colonialism in other terms. It is then urgent to conceive a semiotic evaluation system that does not operate as a device for the destruction of worlds. A semiotics that is an exercise of permanent decolonization in language and communication. That is the proposal of a perspectivist semiotics.


Free translation of the following original excerpt in Portuguese: “ficamos com algo: o mundo não é mais só um”.

It is always good to listen to what other peoples formulate about Western culture, as in compared anthropology. About the solipsism theme, for example, Yanomami shaman Davi Kopenawa (2015), launches the bold formula that white men sleep too much, like the natives, but are only capable of dreaming about themselves and their goods.

Free translation from the original excerpt in Portuguese: “O importante aqui é lembrar que no perspectivismo há mais do que a vista alcança: há toda uma teoria do signo e da comunicação”.

Free translation from the original excerpt in Portuguese: “Os outros foram o que somos, e não, como entre nós, são o que fomos” (Castro, 1996).

Free translation from the following excerpt in Portuguese: “Todo ser com que um humano se confronta, ao longo do processo de produção da própria vida, pode subitamente fazer passar à frente de sua aparência não humana usual o seu “outro lado” (idioma comum nas cosmologias indígenas), atualizando sua condição humanoide de fundo e colocando automaticamente em risco de vida, e de categoria, o interlocutor humano.” (Castro, 2011).

Free translation from the following excerpt in Portuguese: “o maior perigo na vida é o fato da comida humana consistir inteiramente de almas” (Castro, 2011).

But, as Castro says (2015): where everything is human, human is then a whole other thing.

Fermented alcoholic beverage made of manioc.

Free translation from the original excerpt in Portuguese: “algo também só é peixe porque existe alguém de quem este algo é o peixe” (Castro, 2002: 384)

Free translation from the original excerpt in Portuguese: Essa é a guerra de mundos que constitui o pano de fundo agonístico da cosmopraxis indígena (…) Quem quer que responda a um “tu” dito por um não humano aceita a condição de “segunda pessoa” do outro, e quando por sua vez assumir a posição de “eu”, já o fará como não humano”. A forma canônica de tais encontros consiste, portanto, em descobrir repentinamente que o outro é “humano”, isto é, que é o outro o humano, o que automaticamente desumaniza e aliena o interlocutor (Castro, 2011).

Article about the case available in Portuguese at: Seen in October 1st 2017. There is also the documentary filmed by Carranca Collective, available in Portuguese at: Seen in October 1st 2017. It is worth saying it is hard to find records about the event at Globo Television's digital archive. They mention the episode in several pieces of news in the digital news portal G1, but most of the videos are inactive, which a relevant fact. For another reference about the episode, see Lorenzotti (2014).

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